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We shall not cease from exploration, 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
- T. S. Eliot, ‘Little Gidding’ 
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ABSTRACT 
It is required for a theologian, who is committed to both faith and theology, to 
keep integrity in order to not lose the continuity between them. This may cause two 
serious inner problems. The first is with the authenticity of one’s personal faith, because 
the theologian, due to the theological training, no longer see the Bible in the way s/he 
used to do. And the other is with the vocation of contributing to the faith community, 
because the theologian, due to the recognition that pious expressions of faith are not 
technically accurate, may feel uncomfortable with using religious language especially 
when preaching. 
The first problem could be solved by establishing hermeneutical perspective on 
the biblical interpretation, which shows the impossibility of literalist reading of the Bible 
and the importance of readers’ existential self-understanding in interpretation and thus 
affirms diverse interpretations to be authentic. Also, one of the most distinct features of 
Christianity is the translatability—to translate requires interpretation—of the Bible under 
		 ix 
and into particular contexts. Accordingly, the form of Christian faith does not have to be 
so universal that an individual believer’s interpretation is seriously prohibited. 
The latter problem may be deleted if one understands the nature of symbolic 
language, the use of which is necessary in revealing the truth and thus enables a doubly-
committed theologian to help the Church. For something ultimate and infinite can never 
be gripped by something contingent and finite. In so doing, however, one must bear in 
mind that the symbolic language also unavoidably distorts that which is symbolized. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every theologian is committed and alienated; he is always in faith and in doubt; 
he is inside and outside the theological circle. Sometimes, the one side prevails, 
sometimes the other; and he is never certain which side really prevails. 
Therefore, one criterion alone can be applied: a person can be a theologian as 
long as he acknowledges the content of theological circle as his ultimate 
concern.1 
Philosophers and poets2 who have seen the hidden side of life may become social 
misfits. Since they have seen a glimpse of the truth, they can no longer live in ways that 
they used to live. Yet their very nature is to communicate with the world in order to 
deliver the truth that they have gained to those who believe the shadow to be the reality.3 
Philosophers and poets are meant to deliver that truth, even if what they have seen are 
just some fragments of the truth of reality. 																																																								
1 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology: Three Volumes in One, 1st edition (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967), vol 1, 10. This passage is what resonates with my heart. To 
me, this reads like a confessional song that Tillich sings in his agony. 
 
2 Philosophers and poets here include all seekers after the truth by etymological definition 
that ‘philosophy’ stands for ‘love of wisdom’—philo means to love and sophia means wisdom in 
Greek. 
 
3 In the famous allegory of the cave, Plato describes “a gathering of people who have 
lived chained to the wall of a cave all of their lives, facing a blank wall. The people watch 
shadows projected on the wall from things passing in front of a fire behind them, and they begin 
to give names to these shadows. The shadows are as close as the prisoners get to viewing reality. 
… [Plato] then explains how the philosopher is like a prisoner who is freed from the cave and 
comes to understand that the shadows on the wall do not make up reality at all, for he can 
perceive the true form of reality rather than the mere shadows seen by the prisoners. … He would 
bless himself for the change, and pity [the other prisoners] and would want to bring his fellow 
cave dwellers out of the cave and into the sunlight. … The returning prisoner, whose eyes have 
become acclimated to the light of the sun, would be blind when he re-enters the cave, just as he 
was when he was first exposed to the sun. The prisoners, according to Socrates, would infer from 
the returning man's blindness that the journey out of the cave had harmed him and that they 
should not undertake a similar journey. Socrates concludes that the prisoners, if they were able, 
would therefore reach out and kill anyone who attempted to drag them out of the cave.” See 
“Wikipedia Allegory of the Cave,” last modified April 4, 2016, accessed April 14. 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allegory_of_the_Cave. 
		
2 
What allows them to see the hidden side of life is their reflective attitude towards 
life, and they do not want themselves to be buried into life itself, i.e., they have two 
different views both as insiders and as outsiders. While sitting in the midst of history, 
they are the ones who can see history as history, and the ones who objectify the world in 
which they live a life. 
In this respect, theologians are also the seekers who come to discover the hidden 
side of life and faith; they are willing to reflect their faith, denying to stay in the safety 
zone of established forms of faith; they not only are the subject to their faith but also dare 
to objectify it; they are not only the believers but also the skeptics; they try to view their 
faith from the perspective of both an insider and an outsider; they, as Tillich wrote, are 
committed and alienated, but they still ultimately concern their faith.4 
Not all theologians are included in this discussion. Those who take advantage of 
theology only so as to strengthen, restate, and defend their established forms of faith, 
whether conservative or liberal, are excluded. The theologians mentioned within this 
discussion refer to those who arduously endeavor to objectify their current outlook on life 
and faith as best as they can, if not completely. They, therefore, audaciously expose 
themselves to a variety of theological perspectives. For they are the ones who know the 
fact that one should get out of one’s forest at least once if s/he wants to truly know the 
forest, and the ones who find the old saying to be true: ‘He who knows just one tradition 
knows nothing.’ 
																																																								
4 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:10. 
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Now, let us aptly call those theologians ‘doubly-committed theologians.’ They are 
committed to both their faith community on the one hand and to theology as an academic 
discipline on the other hand. A doubly-committed theologian has come to know many 
uncomfortable truths, since they left the home forest and opened the Pandora’s box. They 
no longer feel comfortable with the familiar, conventional explanation of life and faith. 
One of their biggest concerns is whether or not they could remain as serious believers 
when, at the same time, they are thoroughgoing scholars: some of them renounce either 
their faith or their theology; others give up the continuity between their faith and their 
theology to retain them separately; yet, still others, including myself, want to abandon 
neither faith nor theology nor the continuity between them. 
This thesis is an answer to such inner conflict of the doubly-committed 
theologians. This answer is an interim statement of my personal, theological struggle, 
during which I have been a nominal Christian for twenty years, a Christian 
fundamentalist for eight years, an evangelical student pastor for four years, and a 
philosophical theology student with an unquenchable thirst for the truth for the last three 
years. 
It is required for a theologian, who is committed to both faith and theology, to 
keep integrity in order to not lose the continuity between them. This may cause two 
serious inner problems in the theologian. The first inner problem is with the authenticity 
of his or her personal faith, because the theologian, due to the theological training, has 
begun to see the Bible differently from the way s/he used to do. The other inner problem 
lies within the vocation of contributing to the faith community, because the theologian, 
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due to the recognition that pious expressions of faith are not technically accurate, may 
feel uncomfortable or compunctious with using religious language, especially when 
preaching. 
The argument of this thesis is that an academically thorough theology and serious 
Christian faith are reconcilable. The first problem mentioned above could be solved by 
establishing a hermeneutical perspective on the biblical interpretation, which shows the 
impossibility of the literal reading of the Bible and the importance of readers’ existential 
self-understanding in the interpretation of the Bible and thus affirms the diverse 
interpretations to be authentic. For the infinite diversity of interpretation reflects that of 
human existence, and one of the most distinct features of Christianity is the 
translatability—to translate requires interpretation—of the Bible under and into particular 
contexts. Accordingly, the form of Christian faith does not have to be so orthodoxical that 
an individual believer’s unique interpretation is seriously prohibited. 
The latter problem may be overcome if one understands the nature of symbolic 
language, the use of which is necessary to reveal the truth and thus enables a doubly-
committed theologian to help the Church. For if we, following Ludwig Wittgenstein, are 
allowed to say that "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world,"5 then 
something that is ultimate, infinite, and beyond human experiences in the world can 
never be gripped by something that is contingent, finite, and within human experiences in 
the world. In addition, the religious spirit, in many cases, is not ready to accept an acute 
																																																								
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. 
K. Ogden (New York, NY: Cosimo Classics, 2007), 5.6. 
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dialectical theological truth. In so doing, however, one must bear in mind that the 
symbolic language also unavoidably distorts that which is symbolized. 
The thesis will first introduce a world with which a theologian would be faced 
when s/he gets out of the forest and in which the theologian is expected to be detached 
from the Church and give up its exclusive truth claim. Next, the hermeneutical 
perspective on how to understand the Bible will be discussed at length. This must be 
addressed with much importance in that the biblical text is the most valuable source of 
contents of the Christian faith and also the most abundant material for theology. Then, we 
will discuss the nature of symbols—not only the validity and effectiveness of the 
symbolic language used in faith community but also the danger and the distortion of it. 
To understand all of this plays a key role in the task of reconciling the serious faith and 
the best theology. There is no better way of revealing the truth than using the symbolic 
language. Lastly, the hermeneutical view on preaching will be suggested in the 
conclusion. Preaching as an aesthetic work, into which a theologian dissolves his or her 
theology and the intended listeners of which are believers, is a distinct channel used to 
convey the message and therefore differentiates theologians from other scholars in 
religion and philosophy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. THE WORLD OF THEOLOGY6 
In this context, a theologian stands for one who is committed to a specific local 
church. So, he or she may be serving the Church community as a preacher or a teacher, 
being called to contribute to the growth of the Church in number as well as in quality. 
The majority of the Evangelical Church is endeavoring to, on the one hand, expand the 
territory and the number of the Church through mission and evangelism, and on the other 
hand, strengthen its adherents’ conviction of their faith. 
A theologian is also required to thoroughly study theology as an academic 
discipline. Doing theology academically requires the theologians to be involved in 
conversation with other fields of studies. If the theologian is deeply committed to the 
Church at the expense of academic scrutiny and rationality, s/he may be considered as 
losing objectivity and thus may be alienated from interdisciplinary studies, which are 
essential for obtaining a comprehensive knowledge of the humans and the universe and 
which are already widespread in an academic setting. There has been, of course, a 
theological attitude that alienates itself from the world and thus builds its own ghetto. 
Given the reality, however, such attitude should not be taken, because it does not work 
for the Church in terms of spreading the message of the Church and making it relevant to 
the people in this era. 
																																																								
6 This chapter is mainly from my final paper for the course of Advanced Systematic 
Theology 3: Religion in Fall semester in 2015, whose instructor was Dr. Robert C. Neville. I 
slightly edited the original draft and added several paragraphs. 
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In this pluralistic society, the demand for strict, objective theology comes from 
diverse backgrounds: comparative studies of religion, advancement of science, 
philosophical theology, etc.  All of them represent the Pandora’s box that theologians will 
open once s/he gets out of the forest of faith. 
 
1. THE FIRST BOX: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF RELIGION 
First and foremost, the current pluralistic society directly forces theologians to 
explore the relation between Christianity and the diverse cultures and religions. In order 
to do this, theologians should strive to expand their knowledge and study of religion, 
especially a comparative one. From the comparative study of religion, the theologian 
learns that every great religion in history offers its own analysis and resolutions—those 
that are powerful, beautiful, and sometimes even dangerous—of the human existential 
conditions and predicaments; that all the religious mechanisms of salvation is deeply 
embedded to be optimal in their social and cultural context; and that all of them are not 
perfect and even contains adverse effects. 
For instance, Neville’s impressive comparative research of religion, which 
provides an analysis of the human existential situation in the cosmos, clearly portrays the 
mechanism of deliverance that is shared in common among the great world religions.7 In 
his second volume of Philosophical Theology: Existence (2014), he first suggests the four 
transcendental traits of determinateness as the fundamental features of the cosmos: Form, 
																																																								
7 Robert C. Neville, Existence: Philosophical Theology, Volume Two (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2015). 
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Components, Existential Location, and Value-Identity. Each of the features forms the 
normative conditions: Obligation, Comportment, Engagement, and Achievement, 
respectively. However, four predicaments exist, which correspond to each of those 
conditions mentioned above and are generated by the incapability of fully actualizing 
those conditions in real life: Guilt, Disintegration, Estrangement, and Destruction. When 
human beings run against these predicaments, they experience failure and brokenness, 
which lead them to raise an ontological question. 
Brokenness in response to the human predicaments is typical of the human 
condition as such. This brokenness occasions a deeper predicament regarding 
the ontological ultimate condition of radical contingency on an ontological 
creative act.8 
Then, for each of the predicaments, religions provide deliverances: Justification, 
Centeredness, Connection, and Happiness; and answers to the ontological questions by 
building ‘sacred canopies,’ the symbolic systems, through which religions express the 
ultimate reality and encourage people to interact with and engage in the ultimate reality. 
Emerson beautifully describes a variety of symbols to portray the ultimate reality. 
Fortune, Minerva, Muse, Holy Ghost, — these are quaint names, too narrow to 
cover this unbounded substance. The baffled intellect must still kneel before 
this cause, which refuses to be named, — ineffable cause, which every fine 
genius has essayed to represent by some emphatic symbol, as, Thales by water, 
Anaximenes by air, Anaxagoras by thought, Zoroaster by fire, Jesus and the 
moderns by love; and the metaphor of each has become a national religion.9 
																																																								
8 Ibid., 108. 
 
9 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Spiritual Emerson: Essential Writings by Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, ed. David M. Robinson (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004), 181. 
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Lastly, according to Neville, the symbolic engagement in the ultimate reality 
becomes real through these four elements: Ritual, Commitment, Faith, and Inhabiting a 
Sacred Worldview. 
 
2. THE SECOND BOX: AN ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE 
The development of science, such as cognitive science of human brain, 
neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology, has threatened the conventional 
interpretation of religious experiences by providing a naturalistic interpretation of them.  
This ‘threat’ is, of course, against the traditional fundamentalistic interpretation offered 
by religious institutions and not against human essential religiosity itself. However, as we 
may well know, scientific advancement, especially the theory of evolution, has both 
significantly and negatively influenced the traditional religious anthropology in terms of 
the authority of sacred scripture, the human dignity, and the divine providence. Although 
there has been fundamentalistic resistance to the evolutionary theory, “many religious 
intellectuals do not consider evolution as a severe problem to their scriptural authority, 
and even some of them have produced compelling syntheses.”10 Although we should 
admit the fact that the scientific research itself is neutral to both the religious 
fundamentalists and the reductionists, it seems obvious that the scientific research makes 
many of those who are religious feel uncomfortable. 
																																																								
10 Wesley J. Wildman, Science and Religious Anthropology: A Spiritually Evocative 
Naturalist Interpretation of Human Life: 5, New edition (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2013), 38. 
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In his book Science and Religious Anthropology (2013), Wildman offers a 
naturalistic interpretation of the human being as homo religious, which includes cognitive 
science of human brain, neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology. Wildman, as a 
religious naturalist, argues that believing in the supernatural is a cognitive error generated 
from cognitive biases. Indeed, not all religious people believe in the supernatural.11 He 
regards religion as “a combination of side-effects of both adapted and non-adapted 
features of the human organism.”12 
Furthermore, in his earlier book Religious and Spiritual Experiences (2011), 
Wildman makes a framework for interpreting the diverse phenomena associated with 
religious and spiritual experiences (RSEs). The central hypothesis of the book is neural 
mediation hypothesis, which states that the brain mediates all RSEs.13 Among a variety of 
RSEs, Wildman focuses on intense experiences, which are defined as a subset of 
ultimacy experiences and which involve strong and broad neural activation, brain 
connectivity, and intensification of ordinary sense perception.14 Thus, along with some 
abilities of the human brain, such as pattern-recognition, intentionality-attribution, 
dissociability, and suggestiveness capacities, the neural capacity for intensity, for which 
																																																								
11 Ibid., 85. 
 
12 Ibid., 56. 
 
13 Wildman, Religious and Spiritual Experiences (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 31. 
 
14 Ibid., 269. 
		
11 
intense experiences are the reactions, “prepares the way for the emergence of complex 
forms of religious experience.”15 
Wildman affirmatively asserts that “the religious naturalist and pragmatist 
approach allows for a more comprehensive, inclusive, and persuasive interpretation of the 
offerings of all disciplinary stakeholders than competitor theological interpretations, 
whether theistic or atheistic, strongly affirmative or wholly critical”16. Mainstream 
theologians have been wrestling with this challenge and offered some responses - 
intelligent design theory, theistic evolution, and the process view of evolution17. But, 
according to Wildman, the ultimate resolution is to abandon the traditional religious 
anthropomorphic perspective.18 
 
3. THE THRID BOX: PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGIES 
Thirdly, as being faced with many different philosophical alternatives of the 
concept of God, a doubly-committed theologian goes through one of the hardest times of 																																																								
15 Ibid., 269. 
 
16 Wildman, Science and Religious Anthropology, 9. 
 
17 All of those responses, however, are not science but rather pseudoscience in that they 
are based upon the unfalsifiable assumption of God’s existence as an agent. In addition, Dawkins’ 
criticism of the Intelligent Design theory as implausible seems plausible. According to Dawkins, 
this theory worships ‘the God of the Gaps’. That is, if an apparent gap, which cannot be explained 
by the present-day scientific knowledge or understanding, is found, then “it is assumed that God, 
by default, must fill it” (Dawkins, 2008, 151). For example, the Intelligent Design theory takes 
the Irreducible Complexity problem as evidence for the Designer’s existence. But, Dawkins 
successfully shows such an argument as far-fetched by making an analogy of Climbing Mount 
Improbable (147). See Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion, Reprint edition (Boston: Mariner 
Books, 2008). 
 
18 Wildman, Science and Religious Anthropology, 41. 
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faith crisis. There have been various concepts of God, which are alternative to the 
conventional concept of anthropomorphic God. According to Schleiermacher, God 
designates “the Whence of our receptive[objective self in the world] and active[subjective 
self toward the world] existence,”19 therefore upon this whence, human beings have 
feeling of absolute dependence. ‘Whence’ is not the world nor any single part of the 
world20 nor a being besides other beings but rather something that ultimately conditions 
everything. 
For Tillich, God is a being-itself, and “the being of God cannot be understood as 
the existence of a being alongside others or above others.”21 He argues that many 
confusions in regards to the doctrine of God and many apologetic weaknesses could be 
avoided “if God were understood first of all as being itself or as the ground of being.”22 
He also describes God as the infinite power of being in everything and above 
everything.23 Wildman also uses the term ‘ground of being’ to address a religious 
naturalistic concept of God, evaluating it much more adequate to embrace other religious 
																																																								
19 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (Berkeley, CA: Apocryphile Press, 
2011), 16. 
 
20 Ibid., 17. 
 
21 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:235. 
 
22 Ibid., 1:235. 
 
23 Ibid., 1:236. 
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traditions as well as the cutting edge of scientific research and denying the 
super/supranatural conception of anthropomorphic God.24 
For Whitehead, God is “the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act.”25 
Whitehead’s process philosophy rejects the modern concept (or illusion) of an individual 
entity as completely separated from others and the whole world and sees the reality as a 
constantly changing world where everything—including the self—is deeply 
interconnected in an organic relation, thus determining and being determined by each 
other. In Whiteheadian language, every actual (or epochal) occasion is entangled with 
one another, and therefore “the various actual occasions enter into each other’s 
natures.”26 As a result, every individual entity does not exist on its own but is “in its 
essence social and requires the society in order to exist. In fact, the society for each entity 
… is the all inclusive universe.”27 
Any given instance of experience is only possible so far as the antecedent facts 
permit …  and … one occasion, already actual, enters into the birth of another 
instance of experienced value. There is not one simple line of transition from 
occasion to occasion, though there may be a dominant line. The whole world 
conspires to produce a new creation. It presents to the creative process its 
opportunities and its limitations.28 
																																																								
24 Wesley J. Wildman, “Behind, Between, and Beyond Anthropomorphic Models of 
Ultimate Reality,” in Models of God and Alternative Ultimate Realities, ed. Jeanine Diller and 
Asa Kasher (New York: Springer, 2013), 885–906. 
 
25 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making: Lowell Lectures, 1926, 2nd edition 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1996), 154. 
 
26 Ibid., 102. 
 
27 Ibid., 108. 
 
28 Ibid., 112-113. 
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And at every creative moment, God participates in making something that exists 
as a possibility into something actual. God is creativity itself, which makes the temporal 
world possible by continuously leading this process of creation.29 
There are still many other alternative concepts of God: Ontological Creative Act 
(Neville), the depth structure of nature (religious naturalism), and The Unnamable (both 
death of God theology and mystical theology). And all of these alternatives are not brand-
new. This kind of variety in the understanding of God can be found not only in the 
Hebrew Bible and the New Testament but also in the teachings of some of the greatest 
Church Fathers, such as Augustine and Aquinas, as well as medieval mystics. 
One of the biblical supports for The Unnamable, for instance, can be found in the 
Hebrew Bible. In the book of Job, God rejects all interpretations offered by Job’s friends 
and also rebukes Job’s complaint against God. For a complaint against something is 
essentially caused when one’s understandings of it prove to be inaccurate. In addition, the 
Ten Commandments require the Israelites not to make any idol for themselves “whether 
in the form of anything that is in heaven above, or that is on the earth beneath, or that is 
in the water under the earth,”30 because the making of an idol “make[s] wrongful use of 
the name of the Lord your God,”31 and because “the Lord will not acquit anyone who 
misuses his name.”32 The name of Jehovah represents this most clearly. When Moses 
																																																								
29 Ibid., 110. 
 
30 Exodus 20:4, NRSV. 
 
31 Exodus 20:7, NRSV. 
 
32 Exodus 20:7, NRSV. 
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asked God his name, God answered “I am who I am … Thus you shall say to the 
Israelites, ‘The Lord, the God of your ancestors, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, 
and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you’: This is my name forever, and this my title for 
all generations.”33 In other words, God cannot be named; there cannot be a universal 
name for God; there can only be an experiential and thus fragmentary name for God, such 
as God of Smith, God of Michael, and God of Job. God is the ineffable. 
 
Opening many Pandora’s boxes would force a doubly-committed theologian to 
face many dilemmas, first of all, on how to interpret the Bible that has been the absolute 
criterion for the theologian’s faith and theology, since it may be the absolute authority of 
the sacred texts against which the contemporary secularized world is challenging most 
aggressively. In such situation, the theologian is asked not to literally treat the Bible as 
this may make him or her frustrated, because the mainline Church, at least in Korea and 
in the Korean Church in America, generally believes that only the literal reading of the 
Bible can lead the readers to the right path for the true Christian faith. The next chapter 
will try to address this dilemma in terms of hermeneutics.  
																																																								
33 Exodus 3:14-15, NRSV. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH TO THE BIBILICAL INTERPRETAION 
If we can divide the world religions into two categories—religion of the book and 
that of the mind—, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are to be in the former type.34 
Religions of the book give their sacred texts an absolute authority and derive the contents 
of their faith from those texts. Due to this tendency, the first and the most crucial 
theological task of the religions of the book must be an attitude toward the sacred book 
and the interpretation of it. Therefore, one can easily presume that one of the most 
profound challenges of the contemporary academic achievements spelled out in the 
previous chapter is the demand for creating an attitude to the sacred books that is relevant 
to the contemporaries. 
As far as Christianity is concerned, the ways of responding to this challenge are 
many: some people, by taking a fundamentalistic path, stick to the Biblical inerrancy and 
thus absolutize the Bible; others, by taking a liberalistic path, degrade the Bible into one 
of many guidebooks for ethics and thus relativize it; still others, by taking an eclectic path, 
try to show the compatibility of their faith with the present day world—some of which 
demythologize the Bible through the use of the existential method, and some of which 
apologize their faith contents through the use of the best science. 
How should we then approach to the Bible? In the mainline Christianity across 
the globe, the literal reading of the Bible generally has been regarded as the only way that 																																																								
34 Other world religions, such as Buddhism and Hinduism, certainly have their sacred 
books, but they are normally categorized into a religion of mind in that meditation and 
enlightenment are much more emphasized in those religions than an interpretation of their books. 
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allows us to retain the genuine Christian faith. This chapter, by suggesting a 
hermeneutical perspective on the interpretation of the biblical text, will show both the 
impossibility of the literal reading of the Bible and the inevitable diversity of the biblical 
interpretation. By virtue of this, one shall see that it is untrue that there is only one way of 
preserving the true Christian faith, but instead, there are many—infinitely many, I would 
argue. Every reader, including a literalist, is indeed an interpreter, and every 
interpretation is unique and valid in its own terms under its own circumstance. For the 
infinite diversity of interpretation reflects that of human existence. An interpretation is a 
manifestation of a being, and a being becomes an existent through interpretation. 
Additionally, the translatability of the Bible has played the pivotal role in the expansion 
of Christianity; to translate means to interpret from and into the particular contexts. 
 
1. AN ENDEAVOR TO RECONSTRUCT AN OBJECTIVE MEANING 
As an opposition to the literalist reading of the Bible, a question must arise as to 
whether it is really possible to read a text and understand it in a literal sense. But is it not 
the case that understanding something itself is interpreting it? Can we get to know 
something without going through the process of interpretation? The answer is we cannot. 
We shall see this as being true as we read Schleiermacher’s (1768-1834) book. According 
to the publisher’s book review, his book Hermeneutics and Criticism (1838),35, is “the 
founding text of modern hermeneutics, … [and] it develops ideas about language and the 
																																																								
35 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Schleiermacher: Hermeneutics and Criticism: And Other 
Writings, ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
		
18 
interpretation of texts that are in many respects still unsurpassed and are becoming 
current in the contemporary philosophy of language.”36 
Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical goal is to construct the true meaning of a text 
beyond the surface level of what the text says and to understand the original meaning, 
even more wholly than the author him/herself understands his or her own writing.37 In 
order to achieve this goal, Schleiermacher argues throughout the book that one must not 
only thoroughly investigate the language of the text and the era that the language is used 
in but also take account of the author’s psychology. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the 
impossibility of the complete success in achieving his goal. 
To understand why Schleiermacher could not help but admit this impossibility, it 
would be best to first investigate through, the minimal unit of meaning, a word. One may 
think of a word as having a definite meaning on its own, but this proves to be untrue 
when one looks at a dictionary while translating in order to find out a proper meaning of 
a foreign word. One word can have many different meanings in different contexts, and 
there could infinitely many different contexts, given the countless number of possible 
situations in which the word could be used—the region, the time, the relationship 
between speaker and listener, the sentence that the word is put in, and so on. 
The word is not isolated; its determinacy does not emerge from itself but from 
its surroundings, and we are only permitted to bring the primary unity of the 
word together with these surroundings so as to find what is right each time.38 
																																																								
36 Ibid., Back cover. 
 
37 Ibid., 23. 
 
38 Ibid., 35. 
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Accordingly, Schleiermacher argues that we only have a general image of a word, 
not a concrete concept of it, and this gives a word the multiple meanings by contexts.39 A 
pure form of a word as a sign does not contain any meaning in itself, but rather, a general 
image of a word “only come[s] into consciousness via particular impressions,”40 and 
therefore, an individual word can never be reduced to a certain concept but “only to a 
general location where several particular things are located together.”41 
One can easily understand this by thinking about the process of a child’s 
acquisition of language: a child does not learn the universal, objective meaning of a word 
in a dictionary, but instead, the child draws in his or her mind the general image of that 
word by the various, particular contexts in which the word is situated and used. This also 
means that the general image of a word constantly changes as a person is always exposed 
to different situations. Thus, not only is a word’s meaning in a particular situation largely 
determined by the general image that a person already has, but every particular situation 
also shapes the general image of the word. 
The image always remains what dominates; and in such a way that it cannot be 
completely reproduced in language. We can never express something individual 
through language, except to the extent to which it is present as an image or a 
sequence of images. A personality can never be reproduced by a definition, but, 
as in a novel or a drama, only by the image, which is the better the more all the 
parts in it cohere.42 
																																																								
39 Ibid., 271. 
 
40 Ibid., 277. 
 
41 Ibid., 279. 
 
42 Ibid., 279. 
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Considering the difficulty of determining the meaning of a word in a certain 
situation, one must admit the fact that every reader is an interpreter. One always has to 
struggle with contexts in order to grasp the true meaning of a word, but the scope of 
context is unimaginably large—phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph, chapter, the entire 
work, the intended reader of that work, the author’s other works, the author’s 
contemporary works of literature, political and economical situation of the society, 
climate, and the list goes on forever. 
As far as the Biblical text is concerned, one should bear in mind that while “we 
write for the eye, the ancients wrote for the ear”43 and that the writers of the New 
Testament, except Paul and John, were not very good at writing in Greek that readers 
may have trouble distinguishing between “the didactic writings, where the causal 
connection dominates, and … the historical writings, where narrative connection 
dominates.”44 Plus, the Greek language that the New Testament writers used was not 
academic, and as such, this makes it harder to determine the meaning behind that Greek 
text. Furthermore, what makes it much harder is the fact that while the writers’ language 
must be, of course, subsumed under “the totality of the Greek language,”45 those writers, 
at the same time, were largely influenced by both LXX and Apocrypha especially in 
terms of their theological expressions.46 
																																																								
43 Ibid., 48. 
 
44 Ibid., 49. 
 
45 Ibid., 39. 
 
46 Ibid., 40. 
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Therefore, Schleiermacher focused on the reconstruction of the era of an author in 
order to attain the original meaning of a text—he goes on to seek to know the hidden 
meaning of which the author him/herself was not aware. For “only direct tradition [in the 
sense of ‘transmission’] from the real life of the language gives the source for the 
knowledge of the vocabulary.”47 
It seemed natural for Schleiermacher to assert that the philosophical explanation 
applicable to other literature must precede dogmatic explication, because “without the 
preceding philosophical explication, which tries to understand every thought and every 
expression via its context, one cannot have a good conscience in relation to dogmatic 
explication.”48 Thus, in order for a theologian, while interpreting the Bible, to be 
unbiased by the doctrinal perspectives on the Bible of the era and to find the objective 
meaning of the Bible, a certain fixed theological perspective of the time should be 
“regarded as non-existent.”49 He also opposed both the assumption of the Bible as One 
work of One writer50 and the presupposition of biblical inerrancy.51 Listen to 
Schleiermacher’s daring statement: 
Here the question now imposes itself on us in passing, as to whether the Holy 
Books ought to be dealt with differently because of the Holy Spirit? … We 
must also, second, not believe that in the Scriptures the whole of Christianity 
was the immediate object. … We must … assume that, even if the writers were 																																																								
47 Ibid., 24. 
 
48 Ibid., 54. 
 
49 Ibid., 86. 
 
50 Ibid., 52. 
 
51 Ibid., 81. 
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dead tools, the Holy Spirit could only have spoken through them in the way 
they themselves would have spoken.52 
Schleiermacher, of course, acknowledged both the impossibility of a complete 
understanding of a text53 and the fact that one can “only ever attain [that complete 
understanding] via approximation.”54 However, he was “wholly concerned to reconstruct 
the work in the understanding, as originally constituted,”55 that he failed to pay a 
significant attention to both 1) the critical role of the uniqueness of individual recipients’ 
subjective self in making sense of the text in every act of understanding and 2) the 
irreducibility of a text itself into one interpretation. Gadamer also recognized this 
impossibility and Schleiermacher’s shortcomings in his hermeneutical work. 
 
2. THE INEVITABLE SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING 
Both Schleiermacher and Gadamer admitted the impossibility of the complete 
reconstruction of the original meaning of a text, but their hermeneutical works unfolded 
in opposite directions: while Schleiermacher’s work solely centered on attempting to 
reconstruct an objective meaning of a text, Gadamer focused on the fact that the meaning 
of a text is only through the subjective understanding. 
																																																								
52 Ibid., 16-17. 
 
53 Ibid., 157. 
 
54 Ibid., 277. 
 
55 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall, 2nd Revised edition (New York: Continuum, 2004), 158. 
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Understanding must be conceived as a part of the event in which meaning 
occurs, the event in which the meaning of all statements—those of art and all 
other kinds of tradition—is formed and actualized.56 
Schleiermacher stared at the past, but Gadamer looked to the present. In this 
regard, Gadamer follows Hegel, who noted that “the essential nature of the historical 
spirit consists not in the restoration of the past but in thoughtful mediation with 
contemporary life.”57 
For Gadamer, Schleiermacher’s attempt is by principle impossible and even 
irrelevant, because a text wrenched from its original world is not “a timeless object … but 
belongs to a world that alone determines its full significance.”58 
Ultimately, this view of hermeneutics is as nonsensical as all restitution and 
restoration of past life. Reconstructing the original circumstances, like all 
restoration, is a futile undertaking in view of the historicity of our being. What 
is reconstructed, a life brought back from the lost past, is not the original. In its 
continuance in an estranged state it acquires only a derivative, cultural 
existence. … Even a painting taken from the museum and replaced in a church 
or building restored to its original condition are not what they once were—they 
become simply tourist attractions. Similarly, a hermeneutics that regarded 
understanding as reconstructing the original would be no more than handing on 
a dead meaning.59 
The original meaning of a text is only preserved in the original world and, strictly 
speaking, in the mind of the author of the text. Instead of paying too much attention to 
how to grasp the objective meaning of a text, Gadamer tries to show that the meaning of a 
text occurs only through the individual reader’s subjective worldview, which is totally 																																																								
56 Ibid., 157. 
 
57 Ibid., 161. 
 
58 Ibid., 158. 
 
59 Ibid., 159-160. 
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based on one’s unique life experiences, for the limit of our experience is the limit of our 
world, and our world in turn determines the way we see, read, and interpret. In other 
words, our understanding of a text is essentially limited to our worldview that is unique to 
each one of us. 
Seeing something and grasping it into our consciousness constitute together an act 
of understanding, which requires a certain perspective that has been unconsciously 
shaped by countless experiences in countless contexts, whether biological, environmental, 
cultural, or historical. The clarity of the concepts is “not enough for living knowledge, 
rather, there must be certain anticipations and predilections present.”60 As such, it can be 
implied that the idea of pure seeing is “dogmatic abstraction that artificially reduces 
phenomena.”61 Things are not given to us as mere raw materials so that we can put all 
letters together and make an objective meaning that is agreeable to everyone by using 
one’s reason. But because our sense-making process is largely unconscious and 
instinctive rather than conscious and rational, when these raw materials are given to us, 
we unconsciously and instinctively associate them with certain images and established 
values in our mind. 
This means that we already have in our mind a preexisting view of the world, 
which is at work prior to the work of consciousness. This unconsciously activated view 
of the world has been shaped, according to Gadamer, by Bildung [culture]. Because the 
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self is culturally cultivated, it “surpasses all of the natural sciences,” and thus Bildung 
suggests “an extensive historical contexts.”62 
Every single individual who raises himself out of his natural being to the 
spiritual finds in the language, customs, and institutions of his people a pre-
given body of material which, as in learning to speak, he has to make his own. 
Thus every individual is always engaged in the process of Bildung and in 
getting beyond his naturalness, inasmuch as the world into which he is growing 
is one that is humanly constituted through language and custom.63 
Through Bildung, we acquire what Gadamer called sensus communis [communal 
sense], which is, in contrast with the abstract universality of reason, “the concrete 
universality represented by the community of a group, a people, a nation, or the whole 
human race.”64 
For their object, the moral and historical existence of humanity, as it takes 
shape in our words and deeds, is itself decisively determined by the sensus 
communis.65 
The way we see the world is influenced not only by the communal sense of our 
society but also by our personal experiences that are unique compared to others’ 
experiences. For instance, I once heard a neuroscientist say that seven billion moons rise 
in the sky every night, which means that everyone sees the moon differently, although, of 
course, there exists only one physical moon in the outer space. She explained the reason 
why we perceive the same physical object in different ways: Human beings are born with 
nearly one hundred billion nerve cells [neurons] in the brain. Those neurons, loosely 																																																								
62 Ibid., 16. 
 
63 Ibid., 13. 
 
64 Ibid., 19. 
 
65 Ibid., 20. 
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connected to each other right after birth, become even more closely connected to one 
another as time passes, and the way they are connected largely depends upon what the 
individual experiences. As such, the structure of the brain that has been shaped by the 
past experiences will determine the manner of the individual experiences in the future. 
And, of course, those future experiences will also continue to shape that individual’s 
brain structure.66 We do not perceive an object immediately ito our consciousness. Rather, 
objects come into consciousness only through the mediation of the brain’s structured 
patterns, which are so unique that we all see the same physical world differently, even if 
we are in the same society or in the same region or even if we were twins. 
As mentioned in the previous section on Schleiermacher, the way the brain is 
structured is similar to the way one learns a language that is. As far as a literal text is 
concerned, we all interpret the same literal text differently, because we all have different 
images of the same words and the same sentence structures. Our unique life experiences 
generate the difference of a subtle semantic nuance even for a simple, short sentence. 
Therefore, even if Schleiermacher’s work of reconstructing the original world of a text is 
were to completely succeed, the readers would never interpret the text in the same way. 
This is due to the fact that everyone’s life is so different and unique that we would never 
share the exactly same worldview, no matter how intimate we are with one another. 
Countless interpretations come from the same text, the same object, and the same 
experience. 
																																																								
66 See Sang Wook Shin’s news article, “Don’t put your kids in a cage of reading,” last 
modified April 6, 2016, accessed April 16, 2016, written in Korean, 
http://m.sisainlive.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=25732. 
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3. RE-PRESENTATION AS THE PLACE OF MEANING-OCCURING EVENT 
Based on the impossibility of intersubjectivity in interpretation, Gadamer deduces 
that one must surrender the pure objectivity of understanding a piece of work such as an 
aesthetic work or a literary work.67 One cannot discover the pure, objective truth if one 
persisted on trying to do so, because no such pure, objective truth exist. Even if it were to 
exist, the meaning of an aesthetic work or a text only occurs via one’s subjective 
understanding. In other words, the meaning of a work must be re-presented through the 
individual person’s interpretative work in order to be recognized. Without such re-
presentation through the subjective understanding, the work remains unknown. The 
Logos must be made flesh in order to be known. 
The re-presentation of a pure, abstract idea is to have a form as a vessel in which 
the idea is conveyed to the recipients. And what determines its form are our fixed 
worldviews and the methods that we use. To put it differently, an abstract idea must be 
clothed to be recognized; it is the individual interpreter who picks up the cloth, every 
interpreter chooses a different cloth, and therefore, this allows the infinite ways of 
understanding an idea. According to Gadamer, the work of an art or a literature is not 
“some alien universe into which we are magically transported for a time”68 but something 
that needs to be re-presented through interpretation in order to be present to its recipients. 
We do not lose our continuity with ourselves when we interpret the meaning of a work, 
i.e., there is no complete self-forgetfulness that enables us to be absorbed in the pure, 																																																								
67 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 80. 
 
68 Ibid., 83. 
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objective meaning of the work, yet the interpretation of the work must be in the 
continuity.69 Consequently, Gadamer affirms that there are as many interpretations as the 
number of interpreters and that all of those inevitably diverse interpretations are valid and 
true. 
From this it follows that it must be left to the recipient to make something of 
the work. One way of understanding a work, then, is no less legitimate than 
another. There is no criterion of appropriate reaction. Not only does the artist 
himself possess none—the aesthetics of genius would agree here; every 
encounter with the work has the rank and rights of a new production.70 
Of course, Gadamer acknowledges that such hermeneutical attitude seems “an 
untenable hermeneutic nihilism.”71 However, this is not only so because of the infinite 
variety of interpreters but also because of “the work’s own possibilities of being that 
emerge as the work explicates itself, as it were, in the variety of its aspects,”72 namely, 
the irreducibility of a work into one interpretation. For every work must be situated in a 
particular circumstance in order to exist, and the work itself can be understood differently 
in different situations. For example, if one detaches a character from the background of a 
painting and places the character into another background, then the character will be 
portrayed differently than when it was in its original background. Also, a certain object 
can have different usages based upon its surroundings and can be evaluated differently in 
relation to other objects in various situations. A certain object must exist in a web of 
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relations of meanings, and thus, the object’s meaning is assigned its meaning only within 
that relational web. Tersely put, nothing exists outside this web. Even if were to exist 
outside of this web, no one would be able to see it. Thus, things that are beyond the 
context are no better than non-beings. 
This is also applicable to the biblical interpretation. The same texts are to be 
understood differently in different situations not only because of the difference among the 
interpreters but more because of the irreducible dynamics of the biblical passage’s being 
itself that “imposes itself on every interpreter immediately, in its own way.”73 No one 
interpretation is able to penetrate the whole Bible in all circumstances for all people in all 
generations and in every moment of anyone’s life. The meaning of a certain biblical 
passage only occurs to a particular individual under a particular circumstance. 
Of course, there could be more correct interpretations than others in the sense that 
some are closer to the original intent of the writer than others are. When we are to choose 
a more accurate interpretation, the tradition formed by great church Fathers, theologians, 
and ancestors of faith remains “effective as a model,” and every new interpretative 
attempt “must come to terms” with the model.74 But, the criteria for the correctness are 
“highly flexible and relative” that the fixed criterions for correctness are not allowed. For 
Gadamer, the canonization of a particular interpretation is “a failure to appreciate the real 
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task of interpretation,”75 and therefore, the Bible should be left open to future 
reinterpretations,76 in which the decisive factor is the circumstances.77 
In conclusion, Gadamer put much stress on both 1) the critical role of the 
uniqueness of individual recipients’ subjective self in making sense of the text in every 
act of understanding and 2) the irreducibility of a text itself into one interpretation, while 
clearly rejecting both the extremes in interpretation, absolutism, a blind imitation of a 
tradition as a model; and relativism, a mere variety of conceptions.78 
A text is only read within its context. If its context is changed, the text itself is 
also changed, too. For a text exists in and acquires its meaning from the interwoven web 
of relations within a context. One of the most representative works of situating a text into 
a particular context is translation. It moves the Scripture from one context to another. In 
the next section, we shall briefly see both how the translation of the Bible played a 
critical role in the Christian expansion and why it became the birthmark of Christianity. 
This will give us a good reason for the affirmation of the diverse biblical interpretations 
and faith forms. 
 
																																																								
75 Ibid., 118. 
 
76 Ibid., 118. 
 
77 Ibid., 20. 
 
78 Ibid., 117. 
		
31 
4. TRANSLATABILITY OF THE BIBLE 
In Korea, there are many translations of the novel, The Great Gatsby, authored by 
an American writer, F. Scott Fitzgerald. By the time the movie, The Great Gatsby, 
directed by Baz Luhrmann and starred by Leonardo DiCaprio, came out in 2013, four 
major publishers released new translations of the novel, respectively, and this caused a 
huge controversy in the Korean literary circle and among literature critics and enthusiasts 
on which translation was the best. I watched this controversy with amusement because all 
of the new four translators are very famous—one of them is a best-selling novelist and 
the rest are the most prominent professional translators—and because I had also read the 
novel in two different versions and saw the movie as well. 
This controversy clearly shows the difficulty of translation. Translation is 
basically a transplantation of a certain text from one context to another in terms of the 
language and the culture. Since mechanistic correspondence between the original source 
language and the destination language can never exist, to translate is essentially to 
interpret anew. While every new translation has to, on the one hand, compete against and, 
on the other hand, come to terms with the precedents, it should certainly be a new 
interpretation that aims to make the original text relevant to a particular group of people 
under a particular culture in the contemporary times. In Korea, there is a saying: 
‘translation is none other than creation.’ There is another, which states: “translation is 
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rebellion.’79 The underlying message behind these two sayings is that to translate the 
original text into another language may distort the original meaning and emotion. 
Not only must a translator interpret the original text from its original cultural 
background, but s/he must also interpret the life and the culture of the people of the 
destination language. As for the New Testament translation, it is much more difficult 
given several reasons. The first reason is the huge time gap of two thousand years 
between the New Testament era and the modern times—then, just imagine the time gap 
for the Hebrew Bible. The second reason is the almost uncommunicable difference 
between Greek and the destination language—specifically and most critically—although 
Jesus supposedly spoke Aramaic, the authors, who were not very good at Greek except 
for Paul and John, wrote the New Testament in Greek. The last reason is that there is 
indeed no original Scripture but a lot of codices and copied Scrolls, among which there 
bave been significant discordances in the order of contents and the word choices. 
Additionally, some Scrolls have certain passages that are missing in others, which could 
mean intentional insertions or deletions or mere mistakes or a combination of all of them. 
If we can notice how hard it is to translate between two different yet 
contemporary languages, understanding the difficulty of translating the Bible will be 
much more tangible. Gadamer’s book, Truth and Method, was translated into Korean by 
several hermeneutics scholars, and the translator’s preface bluntly expresses the 
tremendous difficulty of the translation. The chief translator recalled that the translating 
																																																								
79 In Korean language, this expression is a kind of a word play. Translation is beon-yeok 
in Korean, and rebellion bahn-yeok. Because these two words sound very similar, the expression 
paradoxically emphasizes the intended meaning of it. 
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process their work of translation was not able to quickly proceed due to the 
disagreements among the translators, which had occurred on every sentence. These 
disagreements undoubtedly indicate that translation requires interpretative work. 
Considering that Gadamer is still living and thus wrote the book in contemporary German, 
one can easily imagine the degree of difficulty of translating the Bible. 
The difficulty and the danger of distortion in translation have led religious 
people—particularly in the three religions of the book (Judaism, Christianity, and 
Islam)—to be hesitant about the free translation of their sacred scriptures in the name of 
the preservation of the true faith. However, in comparison with Judaism and Islam, 
Christianity has been more open to the free translation, despite some oppositions from 
certain conservative Christian groups. In his book, Translating the Message80, Lamin 
Sanneh argues that the decisive factor in the success of Christian expansion was its 
translatability, which Judaism and Islam lack, and its acceptance of the indigenous 
languages and cultures as valid when conveying the Gospel message. Despite the fact tat 
some conservative groups opposed and prohibited the translation of the Bible, 
Christianity was able to become a religion without “a revealed language, so that no one 
language may claim exclusive monopoly of the message.”81 
According to Sanneh, when the primitive church confronted the outside world, it 
learned how to walk on the fine line between quarantine and accommodation by keeping 
a balance between them, though it has never been possible to maintain a stable balance. 																																																								
80 Lamin Sanneh, Translating the Message: The Missionary Impact on Culture, 2nd 
edition (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 2009). 
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As a member of the primitive church that learned how to balance, Paul played a pivotal 
role. Thanks to Paul’s effort, the primitive Church was able to recognize that no one 
culture could be the final form of the message. Such recognition allowed the church not 
only to translate the message into the recipient’s language and cultural forms but also 
allowed the church to accept the Gentiles as the children of God without a cultural and 
doctrinally circumcision.82 
The Western Church continued to embrace the indigenous languages and cultures 
in order to spread the Gospel. This was not “a syncretistic aberration” but rather “a 
continuation of the historical process that changed the West itself.”83 And “the 
recognition in this assimilation of the irreplaceable value of mother tongues for the 
Christian life”84 made the Western Church kept translating the Bible. The translated Bible 
has been spreading all over the world, especially in Africa during the past several 
centuries. It invigorated the social change and the renewal movements in Africa, which 
allowed the inhabitants to find a new identification in the Bible and to have a new hope 
for the future.85 
The translatability confirms the importance of the recipient, which resonates with 
the expression, “Word made flesh.” It is absolutely important for the message to be 
conveyed in a way that is familiar to the recipient, so that the recipient can fully absorb 
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the message. For “familiarity breeds faith.”86 This is the reason why the Bible translation 
has been and should be repeated over and over again for the generations to come as well 
as for the peoples of other languages. 
Of course, translation inevitably causes difficulty in retaining the meaning of the 
message. Although some believe that the objective knowledge of something does not 
change by its various forms, yet its ideas and its form or medium are inseparable. 
Marshall McLuhan’s famous book, The Medium is the Message87, best exemplifies this 
concept. In this book, he argues that the medium creates the difference in the contents of 
the message and changes the way the recipients perceive the world. 
As the history of Christianity shows, however, there always has been a demand 
for familiarity in order to better understand the message,88 and translatability has been the 
bottom line of the Christian expansion and served as the key component for the 
recipients—in all nations, in all the peoples and in all the generations—to find the 
Christian message meaningful and relevant to their lives. This has enabled the Christian 
Church to accomplish Jesus’ promise: “you will receive power when the Holy Spirit has 
come upon you; and you will be my witnesses in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria, and 
to the ends of the earth,”89 and “go therefore and make disciples of all nations.”90 As 																																																								
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87 Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore, The Medium Is the Massage, 9th edition (Corte 
Madera, CA: Gingko Press, 2001). 
 
88 Sanneh, Translating the Message, 246. 
 
89 Acts 1:8, NRSV. 
 
90 Matthew 28.19, NRSV. 
		
36 
Jesus promised and commanded, Christianity has gone beyond its regional and ethnic 
boundaries and propagated throughout the globe into all nations and all ethnic groups, 
while Judaism and Islam remained within their ethnic fences even until today. 
Christianity was born in a cross-cultural milieu, with translation as its birthmark. 
… “Here is a religion which embraces everything. And yet it can always be 
expressed with absolute simplicity: one name, the name of Jesus Christ, still 
sums up everything (Harnack, 1908, 1:312).” … Christianity entered the 
multiple world of cross-cultural encounter with an open mind and a firm faith.91 
The universal religion does not have to be in one form of faith and in a fixed 
method of understanding of its Holy Scripture. Rather, it should be capable of embracing 
various forms of faith and the different methods of interpreting its Scripture. Are the 
traditional interpretations, which may may have regarded as orthodoxical, indeed a 
certain group of people’s interpretations that have passed down onto us? If God of 
Christianity is for all nations and for all peoples, then the Christian institution should also 
be for all of them, too, without forcing them to conform to one particular interpretation of 
the Bible. During the period of the great conflict in England, John Wesley, in his sermon 
‘Catholic Spirit’,’ argued: 
Though we cannot think alike, may we not love alike? 
May we not be of one heart, though we are not of one opinion? 
Without all doubt, we may.92 
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5. CONCLUSION – EXISTENTIAL HERMENEUTICS 
In this chapter, we have considered the biblical interpretation from a 
hermeneutical perspective. Although an attempt to restore the context of the original text 
is a noble one, and even if such attempt were successful, the biblical passages will not be 
understood by everyone in the same way. 
Many of the postmodern existential philosophers have opposed the modern 
epistemological attitude, which was established by the strong influences of scientism and 
objectivism and has sought to situate a methodology for objective knowledge. The 
modern scientific deduction is consciously performed by Understanding [in the Kantian 
sense of Verstand] and considers a form to be separated from certain meanings or values, 
so that there can be an objective knowledge with which all individuals can agree as long 
as they use their reason in a proper way. 
As we may already know, however, we never see an object through a mere 
deduction operated in abstract forms. Our perception is never “a simple reflection of what 
is given to the senses,”93 nor “a mere mirroring of what is there. For it would always 
remain an understanding of something as something. All understanding-as is an 
articulation of what is there.”94 That is, we all are interpreters. Our interpretations are 
determined by our perspectives, and in turn, our perspectives are determined by our 
world of experiences. 
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Before objectivity, there is the horizon of the world; before the subject of the 
theory of knowledge, there is operative life.95 
The modern Western spirit thought every individual object, including a human 
being, can be regarded as separated from that of which it is a part and therefore may be 
analyzed individually. In modern science, everything is reduced to the atomic level and is 
dealt with as if it can be totally separated from its whole. However, quantum mechanics 
have discovered that everything in the universe is so deeply interwoven with everything 
at the quantum level, at which every object determines and is determined by everything 
in the universe, i.e., quantum entanglement, that anything can never be properly 
examined without considering its relation to its whole. This implies that we can never 
obtain the comprehensive knowledge of something if we detach it from its context. 
Existential philosophers launch their thinking from the importance of context—the 
thrownness of our beings into a matrix of relations, i.e., a context. 
Human beings are thrown, according to Heidegger, into a matrix of real and 
potential ritual systems. As they learn to play in those systems, they work out 
the web of their throwness.96 
In his book, Being and Nothingness97, Jean-Paul Sartre differentiates between 
‘being-for-itself’ or ‘being-in-itself’ and ‘being-for-others’ and regards the latter as what 
allows a being to be existent. Simply put, we become an existent only through the 
ongoing sense-making process, i.e., interpretation, in the web of relations with others, and 																																																								
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consequently everything around us appears with certain meanings only when inside the 
context but not outside the context. We, too, never exist outside the context. 
Paul Ricoeur, a seminal hermeneutics French scholar, also noticed that our 
reflective consciousness does not exist on its own—‘being-for[in]-itself’—but rather 
exists for others—‘being-for-others,’ and that we come into existence through the 
ceaseless interpretation that occurs in the web of relations to others. It is not that the 
existence of the Subjective Self is an essential prerequisite for the act of interpretation, 
but rather the Subjective Self comes into being at the very moment of its act of 
interpretation. For an existent to exist in the world is to interpret it as a text. 
It is the task of hermeneutics to show that existence arrives at expression, at 
meaning, and at reflection only through the continual exegesis of all the 
significations that come to light in the world of culture. Existence becomes a 
self—human and adult—only by appropriating this meaning, which first resides 
“outside,” in works, institutions, and cultural monuments in which the life of 
the spirit is objectified.98 
For Ricoeur, perspective and method are decisive factors in interpretation, 
because what we see is determined by how we see it. Our concerns determine what we 
will discover from a given text. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics “justifies each method within the 
limits of its own theoretical circumscription,” because every method approaches a given 
text from its own unique perspective by using its own method. Various interpretations 
that use different perspectives and methods do not conflict in the same dimension, simply 
because they do not exist in the same dimension. They all take their own dimensions as 
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their stages for interpretation. In other words, the truth that we derive from a given text 
cannot be separated from both our perspective and method.99 
This insight can also be exemplified through quantum mechanics. If an observer 
tries to determine the exact position of a quantum, then its wavelength and momentum 
become uncertain and vice versa, and thus the observer cannot obtain the comprehensive 
understanding of the one quantum, i.e., Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle. This 
Principle is applicable to everything in the universe, because everything in the universe 
behaves like both a particle and a wave at the same time. This implies that if we grasp 
one of the dimensions of something, then the rest of them are uncertain. There is no final 
comprehensive interpretation that penetrates all the dimensions. 
Jacques Derrida claimed that “there is nothing outside the context,”100 which 
means that nothing can exist beyond its context. No one can escape and be free from its 
context and see the world as it is in an objective way. Additionally, we as the finite can 
never hope to master a given context because of its unfixability and unimaginable 
intricacy. So, making an absolute truth claim and a sweeping criticism of others’ 
interpretations are not what we are supposed to do. We cannot. For we do not have God’s 
eye view. 
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Instead, we are to wrestle to draw our own interpretations of the world from our 
own perspectives under our fluidic contexts and at the same time wrestle to admit that our 
interpretations are fragmentary, tentative, and vulnerable to correction. The same applies 
to the biblical interpretation. Even Jesus did his own interpretation under his own 
circumstance. Rather than for the creation of a brand-new religion, weren’t Jesus’s 
preaching and teaching for the reinterpretation and renewal of the old religion? Likewise, 
I believe that we can also identify ourselves with our perspectives (contexts) that provide 
us with interpretative frames on every text that we encounter. 
When shall we open our minds to the conviction that the ultimate reality of the 
world is neither matter nor spirit, is no definite thing, but a perspective? … I am 
myself plus my circumstance.101 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. THE USE OF RELIGOUS SYMBOLS 
Humans can be described as just another ape a from biological perspective and as 
a new phylum of organisms in terms of mentality. Chimps, humans, and bonobos 
diverged from the same ancestor and share almost identical (98.4%) genes, but have 
some key critical differences, i.e., “the symbol systems that allow both language and self-
awareness, apparently the only time in evolutionary history that such capacities have 
developed.”102 It was the symbol system that made humans religious. 
We are a symbolic species, unique in our capacity to engage not just in 
communication but in language. … Our symbolic language allows us to build 
scenarios, plan for the future, and articulate and transmit our cultures. It is the 
wellspring of our uniqueness. … We are uniquely religious. Anthropologists 
have given the name Homo religiosus to our forebears who first buried their 
dead and set flowers and icons beside the graves. We need answers to 
existential questions. We need to believe in things, to structure and orient our 
lives in ways that make sense and offer hope, to identify values and ideals, to 
transcend and interconnect.103 
When it comes to religious symbols, although the use of them is basically “an 
activity of interpretation, a semiotic practice,” it goes beyond the interpretative activity to 
“a transformation of personal, social, or cultural character.”104 In fact, religious symbols 
have been used in world religions to reveal the ultimate reality and to help the believers 
participate in it. Neville conducted a comparative study about four types of Axial Age 																																																								
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religions—Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam), Buddhism, Hinduism, 
and Chinese religions—in terms of how they use symbols to build sacred worldviews.105 
In order for a doubly-committed theologian to avoid the problem of integrity, a 
comprehensive understanding of the religious symbols is required. Through such 
understanding, the theologian will recognize that symbols are not only essential to 
participate in the ultimate reality but will also recognize that the symbols are dangerous 
due to their distortion of what they actually represent. This may alleviate the theologian’s 
psychological pain and may lessen the feeling of the sense of self-deception when using 
symbolic language in preaching. Perhaps, our best theology may tell us there is neither a 
supernatural agent nor a transcendental realm. However, even if that were the case, 
religious symbols that represent the invisible realm would have been effective for 
religious people. We shall see how it works. 
In the long run the theological truth might be that there is no infinite, no God or 
divine matters, indeed no specifically theological truth. Religious symbols, then, 
would be thoroughly spurious insofar as they refer to the infinite or divine. But 
let that be a conclusion, not a premise.106 
 
1. THE NECESSITY OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS 
Without doubt, the things that are beyond the boundaries of our experience cannot 
be experienced as they are. We cannot even imagine something that is beyond the scope 
of our experience. All of our imaginations are limited to our world of experience. No 																																																								
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matter how creative and weird they may be, imaginations are combinations of our 
experiences in creative and unprecedented ways. Therefore, the transempirical—invisible, 
infinite, divine, and ultimate—can only be experienced from the world of senses,107 e.g., 
a pure concept is only spoken and experienced through visible examples. 
A schema is a rule or formula for rendering a transcendent concept in 
experiential terms. … Any circular thing such as a round dinner plate is a 
schematized image of the concept of a circle, as is a circle drawn with a 
compass on a sheet of paper.108 
 As far as the object of religious belief is concerned, it is regarded as infinite, 
invisible, divine, or ultimate and thus beyond our human finite ability of perception. 
According to Neville, although there are a few theological geniuses who can grasp the 
ultimate reality in a literal philosophical fashion, many people directly engage it through 
religious symbols. Certain aspects of the ultimate matters can perhaps be picked up 
through theological concepts, but “most of the existentially important things to grasp in 
God can only come through the schematized images of the religious symbols.”109 
Therefore, the ultimate reality cannot be revealed through metaphysical thoughts alone 
but with symbols.110 
Setting aside the possibility that there is some kind of immediate, intuitive, non-
symbolic registration of the religious object, all other registrations of the divine 
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are symbolic. … The religious object needs to be transformed to the stuff of the 
interpreter's experience and life.111 
Tillich also noticed that reality as such must be expressed symbolically, because 
“symbolic language alone is able to express the ultimate.”112 Thus, “everything religion 
has to say about God, including his qualities, actions, and manifestations, has a symbolic 
character and … the meaning of God is completely missed if one takes the symbolic 
language literally.”113 
Indeed, before the rise of sophisticated theological conceptions and lucid 
statements about the ultimate, the use of religious symbols began to proliferate, followed 
by theology, which reflected upon what those symbols might mean and how they succeed 
in or fail to engage people in the ultimate reality.114 This historical precedence of 
religious symbols over theology has led some scholars to think that studies of the major 
symbols in Christianity “is more fruitful way forward in our time” than studies of 
doctrines.115 For example, Neville explores the major symbols in Christianity—God the 
Father, Jesus the Lamb of God, Jesus the Cosmic Christ, Jesus Christ the Trinitarian 
Person, the Historical Jesus and the Incarnated Word, Jesus as Friend, and Jesus as 
Savior—and maintains that each of the symbols can be shown to be true under certain 
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conditions and untrue under other conditions.116 Ricoeur also inquires from the 
rudimentary symbols of evil to the ample garden of myths117 and noted that a symbol 
reveals something that “it alone is capable of transmitting.”118 
Religious symbols are not just signs that point to their objects but something that 
occupy their objects places. Only through those symbols, can we participate in the 
ultimate reality, because the ultimate must be re-presented in order to be present. This 
leads many people to believe that symbols are identical to their objects. Consequently, 
the ultimate is replaced by the symbols, the transcendental by the empirical, the divine by 
the human, the invisible by the visible, and the infinite by the finite.  
The symbol is not an arbitrarily chosen or created sign, but presupposes a 
metaphysical connection between visible and invisible. The inseparability of 
visible appearance and invisible significance, this "coincidence of two spheres, 
underlies all forms of religious worship. … The symbol is the coincidence of 
the sensible and the non-sensible.119 
Although this coincidence makes symbols necessary in religious practices through 
which believers can participate in the ultimate reality, it is nothing but this undissolvable 
relation between symbols and objects that also makes religious symbols idolatrous and 
demonic. 
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2. THE DANGER OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS 
Religious symbols are useful in leading people to directly encounter with the 
ultimate reality, but on the other hand they unavoidably distort the objects that are 
symbolized. The reason that religious symbols have both power and danger is due to the 
fact that a fundamental disproportion as well as the coincidence between symbols and 
what they symbolize exist. Therefore, the use of symbols is thus a dangerous task in that 
it elevates the finite to the infinite and degrades the infinite to the finite. In this respect, 
religious symbols are “double-edged.”120 
The symbol does not simply dissolve the tension between the world of ideas 
and the world of the senses: it points up a disproportion between form and 
essence, expression and content. In particular, the religious function of the 
symbol lives from this tension. … The disproportion of form and essence is 
essential to the symbol inasmuch as the meaning of symbols points beyond 
their sensory appearance.121 
Neville notes that “vast theological mistakes arise when the symbolic images 
themselves are confused with proper theological conceptions of the ultimate as such,” 
even though what the symbolic images represent often transcend the limits of human 
experience.122 In religious practices, however, symbolic expressions of the ultimate 
are highly likely to be accepted literally, and religious symbols tend to take 
possession of their objects’ positions, i.e., the arrival of idols. 
In a laboratory setting, scientists name objects of their experiments and 
classify them into certain categories. For scientists to name and categorize something 																																																								
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means that they can apprehend the objects’ properties to some degree, if not 
completely. Conceivably, the fact that we feel comfortable with the namable and 
uncomfortable with the unnamable shows our tendency to bring things under our 
control so as to make it easy to deal with them at our will. If we give a certain name 
to the ineffable God and fixate God on that name, it is perhaps because we want to 
seize God’s character in order to make sure that they know how to receive blessings 
and how to avoid calamities and punishments. But every statement and definition of 
God is blasphemy against God. Why so? An analogy of a personal relationship sheds 
light on to the reason. 
Admittedly, our names are basically the instruments to distinguish one person 
from another. Although our names could reveal many aspects of our beings, names 
do not represent every aspect of our beings. Take for another example, blood type. 
Even if our blood types tell much about our personalities, we cannot be labeled by 
our mere blood types. What about star signs? Or the many different character type 
tests, e.g., MBTI, enneagram, or Hippocrates’ four temperaments test? And genetic 
map? All of these are useful to a certain degree, but we are definitely much more 
than that. They present partial, fragmented, and broken images of our beings, similar 
to pictures that portray portions of who we are at certain moments. 
What if someone tries to claim the final, conclusive name or statement of God 
the ineffable? Many religious traditions have rebutted this, because they know the 
ultimate is beyond words. In Taoism, Tao cannot be named, since Tao that can be 
spoken is no longer Tao eternal. Some Buddhists say that they call Buddha “Buddha” for 
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the sake of convenience, because nothing can be its name. God of the Bible revealed his 
name as “I am who I am” and commanded Moses to tell the Israelite to call him not by 
his name but by someone’s God—God of Abraham, God of Jacob, and God of Isaac. C. S. 
Lewis deeply cogitated on this relationship between images and reality, as he deliberated 
over his wife’s death. His profound, beautiful description of that relationship gives us the 
insight on the danger of religious symbols. 
I need Christ, not something that resembles Him. I want H., not something that 
is like her. A really good photograph might become in the end a snare, a horror, 
and an obstacle. 
Images, I must suppose, have their use or they would not have been so 
popular. (It makes little difference whether they are pictures and statues outside 
the mind or imaginative constructions within it.) To me, however, their danger 
is more obvious. Images of the Holy easily become holy images—sacrosanct. 
My idea of God is not a divine idea. It has to be shattered time after time. He 
shatters it Himself. He is the great iconoclast. Could we not almost say that this 
shattering is one of the marks of His presence? The Incarnation is the supreme 
example; it leaves all previous ideas of the Messiah in ruins. And most are 
'offended' by the iconoclasm; and blessed are those who are not. But the same 
thing happens in our private prayers. 
All reality is iconoclastic. The earthly beloved, even in this life, 
incessantly triumphs over your mere idea of her. And you want her to; you want 
her with all her resistances, all her faults, all her unexpectedness. That is, in her 
foursquare and independent reality. And this, not any image or memory, is what 
we are to love still, after she is dead.123 
Although theology emerged from the interpretation of symbols, theology can also 
correct religious symbols. It must check on religious symbols and transform them “for the 
sake of coherence and precision,” because otherwise they can be “perversely 
demonic.”124 However, because religious symbols, “the intermediate imaginative 
representations” of the ultimate reality, have been popular and widespread in religious 																																																								
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life—worship, religious literature, and art, it is immensely difficult to criticize those 
popular symbols by the best critical theology of our times. Those popular symbols are 
likely to be dogmatized, and “idolatry is the necessary product of static dogmas.”125 
 
3. THE ASSESSMENT OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS 
In spite of the great importance of the exactitude of theological truths that 
religious symbols represent, the assessment of religious symbols should not only be about 
the strictness of theology. Some theologians may point out that the use of symbolic 
language activate people’s bias toward some theological falsehood, but the trueness of 
religious symbols is “not important at all compared with what might be the consequences 
of the use of the symbols in religious life or in society.”126 And what is the truth? What 
does it mean to truly know? Analytical description of the objects? Or existential 
engagement? 
Truth is less a matter of true description or explanation than bringing people, … 
into the truth about God as revealed in symbols. A good name for this general 
theological approach is a ‘theology of symbolic engagement.’127 
We as sense-making creatures have propensity to read something meaningful into 
everything around us and cannot tolerate our lives becoming meaningless, because it 
causes us to feel the strangely unbearable lightness of being. We need a story that is so 
grand and compelling that we can align our lives to it. As we may know, in human 																																																								
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history, it always has been powerful stories, not dry theological propositions, that have 
been granting us the ultimate meaning of our lives and thus has been preparing us to be 
existentially encountered with the ultimate reality: “The human ear is only receptive to 
periphrastic truth—a truth that is not always theologically correct.”128 It can be said that 
that “the so-called real world has become a story that we tell each other”129  in the sense 
that we live in a world of our own that has been carved by many engaging stories and 
symbols. And many religious traditions have been providing the sacred canopies woven 
by such cosmic stories and symbols, which present the meaningful orientation to the 
adherents.  
Interpretation is the engagement of the realities interpreted, as shaped by the 
symbols. The symbols are not distancing substitutes for their objects … but are 
connectives that orient the interpreters for better or worse to those objects. 
Without symbols things cannot be engaged only bumped into or missed entirely. 
Reality cannot be engaged in any ultimate dimension unless there are symbols 
for the ultimate such as "God," "Brahman," or "Dao" that articulate or at least 
vaguely identify this.130 
It is not the theological acuteness but rather the religious symbols that have been 
forming people’s existential participation in reality. In this respect, religious symbols can 
be taken to be true, though they plainly are not literally true. Given the power of stories 
as well as the necessity of using symbols, the use of religious symbols may be the best 
way to mediate people, who have no theological eyes or ears, to the ultimate reality. The 
religious spirit is not adept at both accessing and accepting an acute dialectical theology. 																																																								
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Does that imply that every worldview is good owing to the fact that it engages people one 
way or another? Or can we evaluate a worldview? If so, how do we? 
While it has been often criticized that the belief in the scientifically or 
theologically incorrect can cause serious problems, the same is true for the belief in the 
correct. Many dire ethical problems have been caused by the precise comprehension of 
how things really are in terms of physics, chemistry, or biology—worldwide wars carried 
out with horrendous weapons. There is always more to living a life than knowing the 
correct—that is, ethos, how we ought to live. 
The evaluation of a worldview entwined by religious symbols should be based on 
whether or not they are beneficial in making people’s lives meaningful and constructive. 
Of course, it is debatable how to judge something to be beneficial or detrimental, 
meaningful or meaningless, or constructive or deconstructive. Although they must be 
continually examined by the best critical theology due to the danger of idolatry, the 
theological accuracy will not be the canon in the evaluation of them, as religious symbols 
can be perceived as true by virtue of their engaging feature. 
I believe that the criterion to evaluate the symbols should be established from the 
pragmatic perspective. This pragmatic perspective concerns with some current ethical 
issues at a local, global, and cosmic scale. We can discern the demands of the current age: 
ecological crisis, human and animal rights, poverty, inequality, geography of equally 
divided politics, economical structured evil, racial conflict, and so on. People need the 
guidance, the orientation, and the leading principle (Charles Peirce) to not only engage in 
reality as such but also to solve current, pressing problems. 
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Personally, I find the religious naturalistic worldview all-inclusive of many other 
narratives offered by local, particular religions. However, as far as shaping people’s 
attitudes and behaviors is concerned, the naturalistic perspective may not always 
guarantee a high efficiency. Although some people who are talented with the intellectual 
ability can orient themselves by registering philosophical worldview into their lives, such 
worldview has a high entry barrier for a majority of the lay people. If using religious 
symbols is thought to be effectual, it should be encouraged along with the effort to avoid 
the risks of causing dysfunctions by reinterpreting the conventional symbols in ways that 
are relevant to the current practical issues. 
A theologian can feel free to use symbolic expressions and religious stories, 
instead of theological statements and propositions in a scholarly fashion, to help people 
become engaged in the ultimate reality and to help them find the leading principle when 
solving problems, so long as the theologian recognizes both the validity and the limit of 
using symbolic expressions and continues to make symbols relevant and correct as 
possible in a given situation with regard to the crucial current issues. 
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CONCLUSION – PREACH! 
This thesis began with the description of the agony of a theologian, whom we 
have called ‘a doubly-committed theologian,’ because the theologian is committed to 
both theology, an intellectual community, and the Church, a faith community. Because of 
the demands that pressure the theologian to be objective, s/he may have difficulty using 
religious expressions, which lack the theological precision. This situation may cause the 
theologian to go through a crisis of integrity and authenticity, as the religious language 
that s/he is expected to use in the church may not be what s/he sees as theologically true. 
This thesis was conceived to provide an answer to such inner struggle, an answer that will 
help the theologian maintain the continuity between his or her theology and the use of 
religious language. 
Our discussion began with addressing a dilemmatic situation with which a 
doubly-committed theologian has to wrestle. In the world of theology of our time, a 
theologian is to be exposed to the dynamic interdisciplinary studies, such as a 
comparative study of religion, historical criticism, philosophy, and science. This world of 
theology in a postmodern era requires the theologian to be objective in his or her research 
and forces the theologian to doubt the truth claim of Christianity. One possible answer to 
the theologian’s inner problem was suggested in chapter three and four. 
Chapter two considered hermeneutical approach to the biblical interpretation. We 
have seen that there cannot be a final interpretation of the Bible that can be universally 
applied to any region, period, or people, because the given context and everyone within 
that particular context ultimately determines our understanding of something. This allows 
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everyone to have a different understanding of the same biblical passage. For the reason 
that all the different understandings are necessarily caused by the different contexts and 
therefore that an unlikely existence of the one final, objective, orthodoxical 
understanding of the Bible, we should acknowledge that all unique interpretations are 
valid at least under each individual’ particular circumstance. 
Chapter three discusses the engaging power and the idolatrous danger of religious 
symbols. The religious symbols not merely point to something as signs do, but instead to 
manifest the presence of what the symbols represent by taking its place.131 In spite of 
such pitfall, religious symbols are necessary in religious practices, because they play a 
crucial role in forming a sacred worldview as a grand narrative that engages people in 
reality and gives meaning and direction to their lives. The evaluation of religious symbols 
should be based on their usefulness and relevancy from a pragmatic perspective. 
A double-committed theologian, on one hand, can have the confidence in his or 
her own understanding that might look somewhat heretical, and on the other hand, can 
use religious symbols without a pang of conscience, which might contradict what s/he 
believes. Now, the theologian is ready to preach. Being a theologian is a unique yet a 
confusing job. While, like a philosopher the theologian uses his or her reflective thinking 
in their task to seek the truth is his or her reflective thinking, yet the theologian “must be 
in the situation of faith.”132 The object of theology is the ultimate concern, and this 
ultimate concern represents “a matter of infinite passion and interest (Kierkegaard), 
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making us its object whenever we try to make it our object.”133 A theologian’s job is not 
to simply reflect upon the world but to interpret the oracle. 
We have the task of speaking clearly, by taking also the risk of dissimulating, 
by interpreting the oracle.134 
Then, what is preaching? It is an interpretation that is done both privately and 
publicly and only though which the meaning of biblical text occurs. The biblical text has 
a chance to become alive only through the act of reading (reading is understanding and 
understanding, in turn, is interpreting). Just as “a drama really exists only when it is 
played, and ultimately music must resound.”135 Relating to the similar concept, Gadamer 
notes the occasionality of the work of art, which means that reproduction is “the original 
mode of being of the original artwork itself.”136 
In presentation, the presence of what is presented reaches its consummation. 
The ontological interwovenness of original and reproduced being.137 
The meaning of the biblical text only comes into existence when the text is 
interpreted under and into a certain context. There is no one fixed meaning that we can 
discern apart from the different contexts, because nothing can exist outside the context. A 
preaching is a piece of an artwork, only through which the text can have an occasion to 
be present and through which the meaning of the text can come alive. When interpreting 																																																								
133 Ibid., 2:12. 
 
134 Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, 331. 
 
135 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 115. 
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57 
the Bible, a preacher must consider the three different contexts: the context of the biblical 
passage, the context of his or her own, and the context of the congregation. As for the 
context of the congregation, there is no formula for interpretation that can cover every 
context. A preacher is called to interpret and preach for a certain group of people under a 
very specific, distinctive circumstance. The fact that a given context plays a decisive role 
in an interpretative task cannot be emphasized enough. 
For example, as for the interpretation of a piece of constitutional provision, a 
judge has no one formula that can be applied to every case but instead has a reference to a 
great number of precedents. The judge should interpret the law in respect to the case that 
he or she handles, instead of mechanically applying a certain, universal rule. Then, the 
judge’s interpretation of the law also becomes another precedent, which other judges will 
reference for their own cases in addition to the numerous other precedents. This is exactly 
the reason for the difficulty and the ambiguity in the interpretation of the law. In a court, 
the given context of a case plays the determining role, and the judge’s interpretation of 
the law varies with each case. 
Another example also clearly shows the intricacy and the diversity of a context: 
the game of go. Recently, Google’s AI, named “Alpha Go,” defeated one of the world’s 
most brilliant go players, Lee Sedol. This was the first time that the AI computer defeated 
a human go player. Unlike the former versions of AI, Alpha Go had the ability to learn 
through the real games instead of functioning based on a certain fixed algorithm. And so, 
Alpha Go does not choose the next spot according to a rule but rather makes a decision 
according to a probability based on its precedents. If the Alpha Go were operated by an 
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algorithm, then it would have never defeated a human player whose decisions are based 
upon the previous experiences and therefore are spontaneous and do not stick to a certain 
formula. In the game of go, there is nearly an infinite number of various situations, which 
cannot be covered by mere rules or algorithms. And so, a player newly interprets the go 
textbook that suggests the better move, as s/he analyzes the given situation by referencing 
the precedents. 
Likewise, a preacher does not have a magically universal principle in the 
interpretation of the Bible. He or she must interpret the biblical text anew case by case. 
Then, the preacher’s new interpretation, which is done after considering a given, one and 
only context, will be contributed to the original biblical text at least in two ways: (1) the 
new interpretation gives the text a chance to be present, and (2) it can also become 
another precedent that will serve as a reference for future interpretations of the same text 
under other one and only contexts. 
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POSTLUDE 
You get them wrong before you meet them, while you're anticipating meeting 
them; you get them wrong while you're with them; and then you go home to tell 
somebody else about the meeting and you get them all wrong again. Since the 
same generally goes for them with you, the whole thing is really a dazzling 
illusion empty of all perception, an astonishing farce of misperception. And yet 
what are we to do about this terribly significant business of other people, which 
gets bled of the significance we think it has and takes on a significance that is 
ludicrous, so ill equipped are we all to envision one another's interior workings 
and invisible aims? Is everyone to go off and lock the door and sit secluded like 
the lonely writers do, in a soundproof cell, summoning people out of words and 
then proposing that these word people are closer to the real thing than the real 
people that we mangle with our ignorance every day? The fact remains that 
getting people right is not what living is all about anyway. It's getting them 
wrong that is living, getting them wrong and wrong and wrong and then, on 
careful reconsideration, getting them wrong again. That's how we know we're 
alive: we're wrong. Maybe the best thing would be to forget being right or 
wrong about people and just go along for the ride. But if you can do that—well, 
lucky you.138 
Professor Neville once said to me in a private meeting: “To be a person is to be an 
interpreter, and to be a good person is to be a good interpreter. What is important is to 
engage with others in a good relationship.” What an adorable quote! I love it. My 
understanding of this quote was that what is important is to have a good relationship with 
others-including all creatures—by interpreting them (texts) under our circumstances 
(contexts). How can we then be a good interpreter? What does it mean for us to truly 
know others? Here, true is identified with good. Then, not the exactness but the trueness 
of our interpretations (or understanding) of others should be a thing. And I here 
differentiate trueness from exactness. 
Thanks to the modern spirit, we are able to have an exact analysis of the world 
and ourselves. Had it not been for this modern spirit, we would not have had so many 																																																								
138 Philip Roth, American Pastoral, Reprint edition (New York: Vintage, 1998), 35. 
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beautiful benefits—medicine, the Internet, etc. However, that cannot secure the truth, the 
true knowledge of something. Can we truly know the world, for example, if we learn all 
the laws of physics of our space-time and so understand that gravity is virtually a pseudo-
force and that our four dimensional space-time is actually curved? Babies who have not 
yet heard the good news from the Gospel of natural sciences would be able to learn how 
to stand and walk within the field of gravity. They will truly know how to run soon, too. 
Can we truly know each other if we have a genetic map of one another? No! We can 
never truly know someone else or ourselves by reducing them or ourselves into molecular 
formulas. Without those formulas, we are able to learn how to love and how to hate. 
But one cannot rest here; for the question of truth has not yet been posed. If a 
phenomenologist should give the name truth to internal coherence, to the 
systematization of the world of symbols, it is a truth without belief, truth at a 
distance, a reduced truth. … This stage [phenomenology] can only be a stage, 
the stage of an understanding that is horizontal and panoramic, curious but not 
concerned.139 
I believe that to know and to see is to meet and to engage. We only truly know 
someone else when we existentially encounter him or her. Only through the 
engagement—whether with love or hate—can we get to know one another truly and 
richly. I think that is why Max Scheler once wrote, “Love is a bridge from poorer to 
richer knowledge.”140 In order for us to truly know, we must leap over the bridge between 
an objective knowledge and an existential engagement. And this engagement is possible 
only through images and symbols instead of descriptions and manuals. We are inscribed 
onto one another’s being as images and not as descriptions. No one, as an interpreter, will 																																																								
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ever come to close to the true being of others if s/he does not “live in the aura”141 of 
images and symbols. And those images continuously ask us to interpret them if we want 
to meet the real people who are veiled by images. 
We now have to enter into a relationship with symbols that is emotionally 
intense and at the same time critical. To do so I must leave the comparativist 
point of view aside; I must follow the exegete and become implicated in the life 
of one symbol, one myth.142 
All the texts around me—including the Bible and other beings—wait for me to 
interpret them so that they can exist for me, and they also continue to ask me to find 
questions in myself and articulate them, as I interpret them. Therefore, I find myself as I 
interpret them. I become an existent as I interpret others around me. They all ask me to 
interpret them. And I think that to interpret others is to interpret myself and that an 
attempt to understand others and the world is an attempt to discern myself. The world 
exists as a grand, unsolvable answer for me. So do other beings. So is God.  
God, the name for the ultimate reality, exists not as the answer to my life but as 
my ultimate concern that plants inside of me an unquenchable eagerness to seek, and as a 
grand question that ever denies the final absolute answer. Of course, I will never know 
God completely because of his irreducible characteristic. When I am existentially 
engaged with God, I encounter only some fragments of his images. The truth that we are 
to know is thus broken. Though it is broken, it is true. 
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